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The extent of the power of the states to tax interstate com-
merce is an issue founded in the historical conflict between the
requisites of a free-flowing, national economy and the revenue
needs of the states. Because of congressional inability or unwilling-
ness to legislate a solution to this conflict, the Supreme Court has
assumed the task of restraining and delimiting the states' excur-
sions into the field of extra-territorial taxation.' The Court has
entered the fray armed with two potent restraints-the due process
clause and the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. These
constitutional provisions have not been applied uniformly; they
have been used jointly as well as severally, and, in some cases, the
Court has interfused these two non-homogeneous clauses.2
The due process clause3 of the fourteenth amendment requires
that some minimum amount of contact and activity exist between
a state and the corporation it seeks to tax.' This minimum connec-
tion or "nexus" is necessary to establish and maintain the taxing
jurisdiction of states over interstate commerce.' Due process re-
quirements are satisfied when a fiscal relationship is shown to exist
between the imposition of a tax on a corporation which has certain
contacts within a state and the protection, opportunities and bene-
fits afforded to that corporation by the taxing state. In other words,
has the state given anything for which it can ask return?'
The purpose of the commerce clause 7 is to sustain an open and
'Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 949, 950 (1941).
2See International Harvester v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353
(1944) (concurring opinion).
'U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
'See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
5Comment, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1207, 1211 (1965).
'Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, states: "[Tihe Congress shall have Power] To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian Tribes."
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unified national economy. To achieve this end, state taxes must
not have an undue burdening effect on interstate commerce. A
state tax that falls more heavily upon an out-of-state business than
upon an in-state business is discriminatory and impedes the free
flow of interstate commerce. It is, therefore, unconstitutional as a
de facto regulation of interstate commerce. 8 The Supreme Court
has had to reconcile the need to maintain interstate commerce
unfettered by state taxes with the revenue needs of the states. The
results have not been fruitful or auspicious, as the standards of the
due process and commerce clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion have been compromised and impaired by changeable and in-
creasingly complex national economic conditions, personal philos-
ophies of individual Justices, and subtle political pressures.
I. TRACING THE JUDICIAL HISTORY
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Su-
preme Court strictly construed the due process and commerce
clauses. In Brown v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall declared
that any state tax upon interstate commerce was prohibited by the
commerce clause.9 This holding stood unchallenged for half a cen-
tury as the Supreme Court consistently held that state taxes in any
form which impeded or otherwise interfered with interstate com-
merce were an unconstitutional encroachment on the power of
Congress to regulate in the area.'" With the rise of big business and
the surge of capitalistic fervor during the Industrial Revolution,
beginning in the 1870s, subtle transformations of philosophy, influ-
enced by the doctrine of laissez-faire, began to be felt among the
judiciary. While this period can not be considered an era of permis-
siveness by the Supreme Court toward state taxation of interstate
commerce, various inroads were made, primarily in the area of
gross receipts taxes on interstate activities.' Though not always
guided by cogent legal principles, a visible trend developed toward
upholding state taxes whose formal subjects were within the state's
'See State ex rel. Battle v. Bailey & Sons, 150 W. Va. 37, 51, 146 S.E.2d 686,
694 (1965), citing Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
'90 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
tC3 SUBCOMMITrEE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE
CoMMIhurEE ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF ITERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP.
No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1038 (1965) [hereinafter cited as WILLIS COMMITrEE
REPORT1; Comment, 68 W. VA. L. REV. 422 (1966). See also Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 210 (1930); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640,
644 (1888); Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1868).
"WILLIS COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1038.
2
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power to tax but which were measured by gross receipts from inter-
state activities.' 2 Although such taxes were upheld on a distinction
based primarily on semantics, their constitutional signiflance
could not be overlooked, as the states' right to tax interstate com-
merce was increasingly brought to the forefront.'" By 1930, even
though direct taxes on gross receipts which were allocated between
intrastate and interstate business continued to be held invalid, the
judicial branch had sustained state ad valorem property taxes,
franchise taxes, and certain license, privilege, and occupation lev-
ies as only incidental burdens on the flow of interstate commerce.'"
In addition, taxes based on the net income of businesses, which
were both intrastate and interstate in character, were allowed if
properly allocated to the income arising from the businesses' activ-
ities within the taxing state.'5
A further judicial trend toward enlarging the states' right to
tax interstate commerce became evident in American Manufactur-
ing Co. v. St. Louis."8 Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority in
that keynote decision, sustained a gross sales tax levied on manu-
factured goods, irrespective of whether the goods were sold within
or without the state. The tax was not seen as a condition upon
selling goods in interstate commerce but as a condition upon the
manufacturing of goods within St. Louis.'7 This type of tax was
found to have only an incidental or "indirect" effect upon inter-
state commerce, since it attached to the manufactured goods be-
fore they entered the stream of commerce.'8 In its commerce clause
'11d. The subject of a tax is the activity, event, privilege or specific property
right taxed. The measure of a tax is the yardstick or base to which the tax rate is
applied. For example, the subject of a state business and occupation tax may be
the privilege of doing business within the state, while the measure of the tax is the
corporation's gross income from its sales within that state. The subject and measure
of a tax are generally dissimilar but need not be, depending upon how the tax is
characterized. J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 26 (3d ed. 1969).
"A tax levied on the privilege of exercising a franchise within the state of
Maine, which was measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce, was suc-
cessfully defended in Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217 (1891). For an
analysis of this case and others during the same era, see Powell, State Income
Taxes and the Commerce Clause, 31 YALE L.J. 799 (1922).
"Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936); Barrett, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce- "Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or
What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. REv. 496, 498-500 (1951).
"5Barrett, supra note 14, at 502.
"250 U.S. 459 (1919).
"Id. at 463.
"Id. at 464. See Note, Developments in the Law, Federal Limitations on State
Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REv. 953, 967-68 (1962).
[Vol. 76
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analysis of the St. Louis tax, the Court applied what is popularly
known as the "local incidents" test.'9 Continued application of this
test in subsequent cases 0 encouraged the implementation of such
taxes in many states, including West Virginia.2'
As local and state governments struggled under the economic
hardships of the Depression, the Court allowed these political enti-
ties more freedom to satisfy revenue needs by increased taxation
on the local incidents of interstate commerce. The "direct-
indirect" formula and the "local incidents" test were extended and
applied to a variety of state taxes. A state or local tax that was
found to have a direct effect upon interstate commerce was de-
clared invalid, while if it was found to have only an indirect or
remote effect, the tax was upheld." In addition to the manufactur-
ing taxes previously mentioned, numerous other revenue produc-
ing measures, including ad valorem taxes, franchise taxes, net in-
come taxes, and license, privilege and occupation taxes, were sus-
tained by the Supreme Court under the "direct-indirect" test.
"Under the "local incidents" test, the Court will analyze a tax based on its
subject and measure (see note 12 supra). If the subject of the state's levy is found
to be local in nature, then the tax is said not to unduly burden interstate commerce.
See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at 173-74. In American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis,
250 U.S. 459 (1919), the Court determined that the subject of the license tax in
question was the privilege of manufacturing goods within the city of St. Louis, as
measured by the amount of the gross sales of these goods. Under this analysis, and
because it was not applied discriminatorily, the tax was found to be on a local
incident and not burdensome to interstate commerce.
"0E.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (tax on the manu-
facture, sale or exchange of electricity); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
'WiLms COMuTrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1015-16, 1019. Eight states now
have gross receipts taxes based on goods manufactured within the taxing state
(Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, and West
Virginia). The West Virginia tax was adopted in 1921 to replace a corporate excise
tax and a pipeline tax on out-of-state shipments that had been declared unconstitu-
tional. West Virginia's business and occupation tax is contained in W. VA. CODE
ANN. § § 11-13-1 to -25 (1966). Its constitutionality was upheld in Laing v. Fox, 115
W. Va. 272, 175 S.E. 354 (1934), and Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 102 W. Va.
272, 135 S.E. 582 (1926), af'd, 274 U.S. 284 (1927). Business and occupation tax
regulations are contained in West Virginia Administrative Regulations, State Tax
Commissioner, Business and Occupation Tax (1964). The B&O tax disputes proce-
dure is discussed in Chambers & Southworth, West Virginia Tax Law-Hearing
and Appeal Procedures, 74 W. VA. L. Rv. 135 (1971).
"'Barrett, supra note 14, at 498. Comment, 65 W. VA. L. REv. 63, 66 (1962). See
American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
2Barrett, supra note 14, at 499-502; Comment, 65 W. VA. L. REv. 63, 66-67
(1962), and cases cited therein.
4
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The Supreme Court moved in another direction in Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue," in which it considered a state
statute taxing gross receipts from the sale of magazine advertising
space. The magazine, which had its sole place of business within
the taxing state, solicited advertising contracts across state lines
and circulated the magazine to subscribers outside the state. In
upholding the tax, the Suhreme Court cast aside the formalistic
notion that gross receipts from interstate commerce could not be
made the measure of a tax and opted for the more practical ap-
proach that has become known as the "multiple burdens" test."
Justice Stone's statement that "[elven interstate commerce must
pay its way and the bare fact that one is carrying on interstate
commerce does not relieve him from many forms of state taxation
which edd to the cost of his business ' 2 established the underlying
premise of this new test. The Court, in formulating the "multiple
burdens" test, stated that the incidents of the tax could not be
taxed by other states so as to be a "multiple burden" on the inter-
state distribution of the magazine.27 A companion case, J. D.
Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,2 fully articulated the "mul-
tiple burdens" doctrine in striking down an Indiana gross income
tax measured by a domestic corporation's gross receipts. Because
the tax was levied indiscriminately and without apportionment
upon the corporation's gross receipts, it was found to subject inter-
state commerce to a risk of a multiple tax burden.
2
1
Western Live Stock seemed to signal a new direction in the
Court's thinking, with the introduction of the "multiple burdens"
test and the concern with apportionment of taxes affecting inter-
state commerce. The multiple burdens test was applied repeatedly
in cases decided between Western Live Stock (1938) and Freeman
v. Hewit (1946),11 but the war years also saw the revival of the
2'303 U.S. 250 (1938).
2Id. at 259. Justice Stone rationalized that "[p]ractical rather than logical
distinctions must be sought," citing Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S.
217 (1908).
21303 U.S. at 254.
p303 U.S. at 260. For an analysis of the "multiple burdens" test, see Comment,
65 W. VA. L. REv. 63, 66 (1962), cited in State ex rel. Battle v. Bailey & Son, 150
W. Va. 37, 49, 146 S.E.2d 686, 693-94 (1965).
z1304 U.S. 307 (1938).
21Id.
I'329 U.S. 249 (1946). See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944)
(ad valorem tax found to be fairly apportioned); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U.S. 435 (1940) (corporate income tax upheld); McGoldbrick v. Berwind-White
[Vol. 76
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"local incidents" language from American Manufacturing Co. v.
St. Louis, which had never been specifically overruled."
The Court returned to the direct-indirect analysis in Freeman
v. Hewit, which stands as a symbol of an era of judicial confusion
concerning state taxation of interstate commerce. The Court was
faced with an Indiana gross income tax and its imposition on the
proceeds of interstate sales. An Indiana broker sold securities of a
trust estate on the New York Stock Exchange through New York
brokers and delivered the proceeds to the trustee. The tax was
imposed on the gross receipts of these sales.32 Writing for the Court
in a five-four decision, Justice Frankfurter invalidated the Indiana
tax by applying the "direct-indirect" test of nearly a decade be-
fore, stating that "not even an internal regulation by a state will
be allowed if it directly affects interstate commerce.""3 The Court
accordingly returned to the formal "direct-indirect" analysis of
American Manufacturing Co." Neglecting mention of the "multi-
ple burdens" test and the need for apportionment, the Court reaf-
firmed the "direct-indirect" analysis and determined that any
state action impeding the free-flow of trade among states would be
precluded whether or not local commerce was subjected to a simi-
lar encumbrance.
3 5
Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (New York City sales tax held constitutional).
But see Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939) (Washington
business activities tax applied to the entire gross receipts of an in-state firm held
to contravene the commerce clause because of lack of apportionment). For general
discussion, see Barrett, supra note 14, at 509, and Hellerstein & Hennefeld, supra
note 1, at 959.
'In International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349
(1944), the Court, in conclusion, stated: "We only hold that where a State seeks to
tax gross receipts from interstate transactions consummated within its borders its
power to do so cannot be withheld on constitutional grounds where it treats wholly
local transactions the same way." See also General Trading Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
For a general discussion of the above cited cases, see Kust & Sale, State Taxation
of Interstate Sales, 46 VA. L. REV. 1290, 1293-94 (1960).
12329 U.S. at 250-51.
Id. at 257-58.
"See Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169 (1935), and Eastern Air
Transp., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147 (1932), for further
application of the "direct-indirect" test. In Freeman, Justice Frankfurter distin-
guished the tax in American Manufacturing from the challenged tax by pointing
out that the former was based on the contingency of local manufacture, while the
latter was based explicitly on gross receipts from interstate commerce. 329 U.S. at
258.
'32 9 U.S. at 252.
6
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Decisions in the wake of Freeman v. Hewit did little to clarify
the Court's position. In West Publishing Co. v. McColgan,5 a net
income tax was critically examined on the basis of discrimination,
reasonable apportionment, and the possibility of a multiple tax
burden. This analysis was repeated in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.
v. Stone,37 where a pipeline company, as agent for a Delaware oil
corporation, transported oil and arranged with a railroad for its
shipment into interstate commerce. These actions were subject to
the Mississippi annual privilege tax on gross income. In upholding
the tax, the Court cited the extensive growth of interstate com-
merce and the need for such commerce to bear the cost of facilities
and services provided it by the individual states.U Finally, in
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,39 the Court sustained a Missis-
sippi franchise tax, using both "local incidents" and "multiple
burdens" language.
The 1950s saw important new rulings in the field of state taxa-
tion of interstate commerce and redefinitions of the states' power
to tax. In Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, a noxdiscrimi-
natory state franchise tax levied upon a foreign corporation for
doing business within the state that was exclusively interstate in
character was held to violate the commerce clause." Even though
the tax was fairly apportioned between interstate and intrastate
activities, it was held unconstitutional, because it was a tax on
the privilege of doing interstate business.
The most noteworthy changes in Supreme Court thinking
during the 1950s dealt with the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion. The previous jurisdictional standards were substantially al-
-328 U.S. 823 (1946), aft 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946). See generally
Barrett, supra note 14, at 520.
37337 U.S. 662 (1949).
3Id. See Barrett, supra note 14, at 528.
'335 U.S. 80 (1948).
1-340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951). The net income tax was imposed on a trucking firm
engaged exclusively in the interstate transportation of freight. The corporation had
no authorization to engage in intrastate trucking and maintained but two terminals
in the state. Even though the tax was non-discriminatory, and was not challenged
on the basis of "multiple burdens," the Court invalidated the tax solely because it
purported to be based on the corporation's franchise for the privilege of carrying
on exclusively interstate transportation in the state. Compare with Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959), where a franchise tax measured by gross
receipts was upheld as not violating the commerce clause since the express com-
pany, which did exclusively interstate business in Virginia, also owned property
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tered, setting the stage for a period of relative permissiveness by
the Court. Prior to 1945, states could obtain jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations only if they were qualified to do business
within the state or if sufficient constructive "presence" existed to
warrant jurisdiction.4' These criteria for establishing jurisdiction
were discarded in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, which set
forth the "minimum contacts" test.42 Subsequent cases applied
this standard and succeeded in establishing the requirement of
"minimum contacts" as the "nexus" for ascertaining territorial
due process jurisdiction and the right to tax.4"
Further evidence of this reappraisal and reinterpretation of
due process requirements was manifest in Norton Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue.44 The Court found the presence of a branch office
and warehouse of a nonresident corporation within a state to be
sufficient local incidents to subject the corporation to that state's
taxing power, even though the branch office was only an intermedi-
ary in distributing products from the home office.45 Where the
intrastate activities of a foreign corporation were mingled with its
interstate activities, the corporation seeking to avoid taxation on
sales to persons within the state was held to have the burden of
showing that the sales were disassociated from and unfacilitated
by local business. 6 In Miller Brothers v. Maryland," general adver-
"Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 535 (1963). See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877), for a discussion of the older doctrine of "physical presence."
'326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
"3McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Requirements for due process have fallen
under the general heading of "nexus." That is, where the business activities of a
foreign corporation are such that they fall within the scope of a state tax, a "nexus"
has been formed between the tax and the transaction within the state for which the
tax has been enacted. The controlling question then is whether the state has the
right to tax, i.e., has there been a quid pro quo? Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 465 (1959). For previous mention of
"nexus" and "minimum contacts," see West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S.
823 (1946), aff'g 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.,
311 US. 435 (1940).
41340 U.S. 534 (1951).
'"Id. at 538.
'RId. at 538-39. See also Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S.
8
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tising and occasional delivery of goods sold at out-of-state store
were found insufficient to establish adequate minimum connec-
tions to permit the imposition of the state's taxing power, but, in
the same year, the Supreme Court upheld a Nebraska ad valorem
tax on the flight equipment of an airline that made only eighteen
stops per day within the state.48
The greatest controversy was raised by the case of
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota," in
which a non-discriminatory, properly apportioned net income tax,
levied on the business activities of a foreign corporation, was sus-
tained even though the only contact with the state was a sales
office, which served as headquarters for the corporation's sales-
men. Recognizing the inconsistency of past opinions, Justice
Clark, writing for a bare majority of the Court, stated that such a
fairly apportioned and non-discriminatory tax did not violate the
commerce clause, and, furthermore, that sufficient minimum
connections were present to satisfy due process requirements.
Spector Motor Service was distinguished on several grounds. The
excise there was imposed on the privilege of doing interstate busi-
ness within the state; it was not a direct net income tax appor-
tioned to business activities within the taxing state.' While the tax
upheld in Northwestern and the tax invalidated in Spector Motor
Service differed in subject-measure and incidence, in the final
analysis, the differences between the two levies were more semant-
ical than structural.
The Northwestern decision caused an immediate congres-
sional furor, and, in 1959, after the long inactivity of Congress in
regulating taxation of interstate commerce first cited in Gibbons
384 (1935). A business engaged in interstate commerce cannot operate through a
local outlet in order to gain the advantage of local commerce and also retain the
immunities of interstate commerce. WILLIS COMMITrEE REPoRT, supra note 10, at
1044.
17347 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1954). See Kust & Sale, supra note 31, at 1295.
' "States other than those of the corporate domicile can tax an instrumentality
of interstate commerce in accordance with their use in the taxing states, even
though the corpus has no permanent location." Braniff Airways, Inc. v. State Bd.
of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 602 (1954). This implies that firms
dealing in almost exclusively interstate commerce, with very minimal contacts
within the state, such as airlines, trucking firms and railroads, have sufficient
connections to satisfy due process, thus authorizing taxation by the state,
"1358 U.S. 450 (1959).
'Id. at 461, 465. See Kust & Sale, supra note 31, at 1298.
'1358 U.S. at 463-64.
[Vol. 76
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v. Ogden,52 Congress enacted Public Law 86-272.13 The law estab-
lished certain minimum connections between the interstate busi-
ness and the state that were to be satisfied before a state net
income tax could be imposed. If the only business activity within
the state was the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal
property, subject to acceptance outside the state and to be filled
by shipment or delivery from a point outside the state, the state
or its political subdivision could not impose a net income tax. 4
Public Law 86-272 was not, however, a comprehensive solution to
the problem, as it restricted only net income taxes on interstate
income-limitations on state gross receipts taxes with interstate
ramifications were not included in the legislation.
The decade of the 1960s brought expanding budgets and new
pressures to the states in the form of additional revenue needs,
created by increased demand for improved public education,
transportation, and housing. The Supreme Court and other federal
and state courts, undeterred by the congressional limitation on net
income taxes, expanded the states' power to tax in other areas. A
Georgia corporation, which sent no salesmen into Florida, had no
branch office or warehouse in the state, and shipped merchandise
f.o.b. Atlanta to customers in Florida via independent solicitors,
was found to have sufficient "nexus" or "minimum connections"
to be subject to Florida's use tax.5"
5222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
15 U.S.C. § 381 (1971).
"Id. See Note, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Public Law 86-272, 46
VA. L. REv. 297, 300-01 (1960); 11 J. TAXATION 279-81 (1959). See also International
Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244,164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964).
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 US. 207 (1960). See Kust & Sale, supra note 31,
at 1297. Compare with Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). The Supreme
Court later drew the line for "nexus" requirements concerning taxes other than net
income taxes in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753
(1967). In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court had ordered the appellant, a mail
order house with its principal place of business in Missouri, to collect and remit a
state use tax on goods purchased by Illinois residents for use within the state.
Appellant owned no tangible property in Illinois and had no sales outlets, telephone
listings, or solicitors in that state. The corporation did not advertise in the state
by radio, television, billboards or newspapers; its only contacts with its customers
throughout the United States, including Illinois, was by its catalogues mailed twice
a year and supplemented by "flyers." Orders for merchandise were mailed to appel-
lant's Missouri plant, and the goods were sent to customers by mail or common
carrier. Speaking for the majority in a 6-3 decision, Justice Stewart held that the
state's imposition of a tax upon a seller whose only connection with customers in
the state was by common carrier or by mail was a violation of the commerce clause.
Both Scripto and Miller Bros. were cited, but not as authority. The Court reasoned:
10
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This ripening liberal attitude towards broadening the states'
taxing powers, over due process and commerce clause objections,
became most apparent in General Motors Corp. v. Washington."
The General Motors Corporation manufactured motor vehicles,
parts, and accessories in various states and sold them wholesale to
independent dealers in Washington. Although some of the sales
were channeled through a Seattle office, the majority were
approved and processed through the corporation's large zone office
in Portland, Oregon. These motor vehicles, parts, and accessories
were then shipped to local dealers in Washington, who offered
them for retail sale to the general public. General Motors had a
limited number of sales representatives in Washington, who ad-
vised and trained local dealers and generally served as company
representatives, but no business was conducted beyond the promo-
tion of interstate sales to the dealers. The State of Washington, in
addition to imposing a gross receipts tax on manufacturing,5 7 lev-
ied an unapportioned gross receipts tax on all wholesale sales
within the state.5 An action was brought by General Motors chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Washington tax on the sales
from the Oregon office on four grounds-lack of apportionment,
inherent discrimination, risk of a multiple tax burden, and
violation of due process.59 In the majority opinion, Justice Clark
dispensed with the appellant's four claims and substantially eased
constitutional barriers to the taxation of gross receipts from the
sale of goods shipped into the taxing state." The Court declined
"1I1t is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate
in character than the mail order transactions here involved." Id. at 759. Thus, if
Illinois were allowed to impose such a tax burden, Justice Stewart postulated that
the resulting tax enactments in other states, municipalities, political subdivisions,
etc., "could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of compli-
cated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose 'a fair
share of the cost of the local government.'" Id. at 759-60. The dissent, led by Justice
Fortas, asserted that appellant's large-scale, systematic and continuous solicitation
of the Illinois consumer market constituted a sufficient nexus. Id. at 761-62 (dis-
senting opinion).
5-377 U.S. 436 (1964).
VILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1018. Washington's business and
occupation tax was modeled after West Virginia's.
'.WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.04.270 (1961). For a ruling on apportionment of
the West Virginia business and occupation tax, see Dravo Contracting Co. v. James,
114 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1940), in which the court distinguished between apportio.
ment and separation of income by a court, the former being barred and the latter
allowed. The case was commented on in 47 W. VA. L.Q. 236 (1941).
'377 U.S. at 438.
"°WILLIS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1032.
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to prorate the tax, calling its lack of apportionment only "sus-
pect,"'" and refused to consider the claim of multiple taxation,
since the corporation had not shown a definite burden in fact.2
Washington's tax was also found non-discriminatory since it was
based on activities or incidents within the State which the State
could reach and since all businesses within the State were taxed
equally on their wholesale sales.13 Finally, the Court asserted that
the tax did not violate due process because the solicitation and
services by General Motors' sales representatives within the State,
which were "decisive factors in establishing and holding this mar-
ket," forged the necessary nexus between the State and the trans-
action sought to be taxed."
Separate dissenting opinions by Justices Brennan and Gold-
berg (with whom Justices Stewart and White joined) vigorously
pointed out the weaknesses in the majority's argument. Justice
Brennan challenged the lack of apportionment of the tax and the
failure of the Court to act upon that fact, claiming that the Court
had confused two different issues.65 The Court had concluded that
the tax was fairly apportioned based only on the "nexus" standard
of the due process clause but failed to apply the commerce clause
requirement of fair apportionment. 6 To Justice Brennan, then, the
Washington gross receipts tax was unconstitutional owing to lack
of apportionment, as this case involved sufficient interstate com-
mercial activity to warrant a fair apportionment under the
commerce clause. Justice Goldberg, noting the debilitating effect
of the decision on the free trade aspect of the commerce clause,
recognized that while the measure of Washington's tax was the
quantity of wholesale sales within its boundaries, the majority had
declared that the corporation's activities provided the necessary
basis for taxation. Considering the majority's expansive definition
of "activities," it would be hard not to conceive of a state gross
'"377 U.S. at 448.
"Id. at 449.
In Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 315 F.
Supp. 746 (D. St. Thomas & St. John 1970), the federal district court upheld a gross
receipts tax that was not apportioned. In tracing the history of the apportionment
formula requirement, the court commented as follows: "In General Motors v.
Washington, supra, the apportionment requirement was further relaxed, possibly
to the point of abandonment." 315 F. Supp. at 751.
"Id. at 447.
"Id. at 448.
"Id. at 450-51 (dissenting opinion). See J. HELLEPMrEIN, supra note 12, at 185.
4377 U.S. at 440.
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receipts tax that would not be upheld, as "[elvery interstate
sale invariably involves some local incidents-some 'in-state' ac-
tivity. ' ' 7
Despite the forceful dissents in General Motors and the
subsequent uproar in business circles, the decision retains its via-
bility and shows a great willingness by the Supreme Court to allow
the states the power to tax the incidents of interstate commerce."
While narrowing the scope of the due process requirement of "some
definite link, some minimum connection" by hinting only vaguely
that solicitation in a state without more may be grounds for taxa-
tion, the Court did not institute any new guidelines." The Court,
thus, refused to pass on the constitutionality of an unapportioned
gross receipts tax until it could be shown that there was multiple
taxation on interstate commerce in fact.70
A large number of states,7 including West Virginia,7" have
'I7 d. at 456 (dissenting opinion). See also 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV, 1207, 1213 (1965).
"Though the United States Supreme Court has not had an occasion to employ
General Motors, lower federal courts have cited the case no less than six times since
1964, and at least twenty state jurisdictions have cited the decision more than
eighty times.
"Note, Commerce Clause: State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Valdity of
Unapportioned Taxes Measured by Gross Receipts: General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), 50 CORNELL L.Q. 255, 259-60 (1965) fhereinafter
cited as Commerce Clause]; 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1207, 1213 (1965). As the dissent
in General Motors stated: "The test adopted by the Court today, if followed logi-
cally in future cases, would seem to mean that States will be permitted to tax
wholly interstate sales by any company selling through local agents or traveling
salesmen. Such a rule may leave only mail-order houses free from state taxes on
interstate sales." 377 U.S. at 462 (dissenting opinion).
70Contra, J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938), which held an
unapportioned gross receipts tax invalid in that the danger of double taxation was
inherent. But see Commerce Clause, supra note 69, at 261-62, where the author
suggests that the burden should shift to the taxing state to prove the absence of
multiple taxation. Several federal circuit courts have placed the burden of proof on
the taxpayer to show the existence of multiple taxation. In Asiatic Trans-Pacific,
Inc. v. Maddox, 371 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), a gross receipts tax was upheld
because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate how much of its revenue was derived
from interstate commerce. However, in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Gov-
ernment of the Virgin Islands, 315 F. Supp. 746 (D. St. Thomas & St. John 1970),
the court noted by way of dicta that it was incumbent on the taxpayer to prove the
"likelihood of multiple taxation," thereby lessening the taxpayer's burden of proof
as stated in Asiatic Trans-Pacific.
"Some examples of cases applying the tenets of General Motors include:
Asiatic Trans-Pacific, Inc. v. Maddox, 371 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967); Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 315 F. Supp. 746 (D. St. Thomas
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expressly or impliedly endorsed the tenets of General Motors. The
Supreme Court has not issued any new definitive decision altering
or reaffirming the existing status of state taxation of interstate
commerce since 1964.73 However, some judicial vigilance has been
seen in the area of apportionment. 7
& St. John 1970); General Motors Corp. v. Los Angeles, 95 Cal. Rptr. 635, 486 P.2d
163 (1971), appeal dismissed 404 U.S. 1008 (1972); Green v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 123 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1960); Gross Income Tax Div. v. P.F. Goodrich Corp., 292
N.E.2d 247 (Ind. 1973); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Director, 50 N.J. 471, 236 A.2d
577 (1967), appeal dismissed 390 U.S. 745 (1968); New Mexico Newspapers, Inc. v.
Bureau of Revenue, 82 N.M. 436, 483 P.2d 317 (1971); United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Porterfield, 28 Ohio St. 2d 97, 276 N.E.2d 629 (1971), appeal dismissed 407 U.S.
917 (1972); Mid-Valley Pipeline Co. v. King, 221 Tenn. 724, 431 S.W.2d 277 (1968);
Moore Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 14 Wis. 2d 377,
111 N.W.2d 148 (1961). For a discussion of the impact of Roadway Express and
Mid- Valley Pipeline Co., supra, see Hellerstein, IState Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce: Roadway Express, the Diminishing Privilege Tax Immunity, and the Move-
ment Toward Uniformity in Apportionment, 36. U. CH. L. REv. 186 (1968).
nThe West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not explicitly endorsed the
General Motors decision, but it has cited it on various occasions. E.g., State ex rel.
Battle v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 149 W. Va. 810, 143 S.E.2d 331 (1965). In United
Fuel Gas Co. v. Battle, 153 W. Va. 222, 167 S.E.2d 890 (1969), the court upheld
the State business and occupation tax on a public utility's wholesale sales of natural
gas produced within this State and commingled with imported gas, citing General
Motors for the proposition that a tax is not a burden on interstate commerce if
merely an incident to such commerce. For an application of the "multiple burdens"
test and "local incidents" analysis, see State ex rel. Battle v. B.D. Bailey & Sons,
150 W. Va. 37, 146 S.E.2d 686 (1966), where the State's business and occupation
tax on the commissions earned by a manufacturer's representative and merchan-
dise broker from business, 90% of which was interstate, was sustained. The case is
discussed in 68 W. VA. L. REv. 422 (1966). See also Baton Coal Co. v. Battle, 151
W. Va. 519, 153 S.E.2d 522 (1967).
"In Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972), New Mexico levied an emergency school
tax and a gross receipts tax on the total proceeds that Evco, a domestic corporation,
received from contracts negotiated and entered into outside the State. These con-
tracts were made pursuant to the sale of instructional programs created and de-
signed by Evco in New Mexico. Evco argued that the taxes on the out-of-state sales
were an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The United States Su-
preme Court invalidated the taxes, stating that "the tax levied on gross receipts
from the sale of tangible personal property in another State is an impermissible
burden on commerce." Id. at 93. The Court's reasoning seems to revive the "direct-
indirect" analysis last applied in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), but the
Court, in the instant case, also cited Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305
U.S. 434 (1939), and J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938), which
were notable for their application of the "multiple burdens" test. Evco v. Jones,
thus, adds to the confusion as to which doctrine should be applied to questions
involving state taxation of interstate commerce. For an abstract of the decision, see
59 A.B.A.J. 175 (1973).
"In Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969), the Court,
14
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II. A MULTIPLCITY OF DOCTRINES
In retrospect, the history of state taxation of interstate com-
merce can be viewed as an accumulation of the following diverse
factors: (1) Varying and sometimes conflicting Court philosophies;
(2) alternating formalistic and pragmatic analyses devoid of con-
crete judicial rules; (3) incompatibility of the revenue require-
ments of the states and the need for an unencumbered national
market; and (4) an increasingly sophisticated economy empha-
sized by historical events. Despite the trend toward allowing the
states more freedom to tax interstate commerce, these factors have
led to an inadequate judicial response to the problem.
Until the late 1930s, the Court was not generally receptive to
state taxation of interstate commerce, especially in the form of
gross receipts taxes. The "local incidents" test was first used in
American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, where a license tax was
examined to see if it had an indirect or a direct effect on interstate
commerce. 5 New measuring rods of constitutionality were devel-
oped with Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue" and J. D.
Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen.17 On the more practical
premise that interstate commerce must pay its way, a tax was held
valid if it was not "discriminatory" and did not present the risk of
a "multiple burden" on such commerce; a tax on interstate com-
merce which is not fairly apportioned may subject the taxpayer to
multiple taxation which is inherently discriminatory." Thus, a
gross receipts tax, among others, was deemed invalid only if it
placed a burden on interstate commerce not shared by local com-
merce.7" But the Court, in 1946, resurrected the formal "direct-
applying the "local incidents" test and without citing General Motors, sustained a
license tax assessment on transient photographers who, under contract with the J.
C. Penney Co., solicited orders and took children's pictures. See Norfolk & W. Ry.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968), where an ad valorem tax on rolling stock
based on a mileage formula was found to be a gross overreaching of the due process
clause. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965), in
which an assessment formula for a net income tax not wholly based on sales was
upheld as not inherently arbitrary. Nevertheless, the Court scrutinized the tax on
the basis of apportionment.
15250 U.S. 459 (1919).
71303 U.S. 250 (1938).
1304 U.S. 307 (1938).
7 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U.S. 307 (1938); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
See also Commerce Clause, supra note 69, at 258.
71WILLIS COMMIT"EE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1040.
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indirect" formula in Freeman v. Hewit, 0 demonstrating that the
doctrine still had viability. 8'
While the Court was examining taxes on the basis of a risk of
multiple taxation, the nexus requirements of due process were
being substantially reduced. The new standard of "minimum con-
tacts," introduced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
broadened the Court's discretion to find sufficient business activi-
ties within a state for tax purposes. " This redefinition of due pro-
cess and the liberal interpretation of the commerce clause
coalesced with differing Court philosophies in General Motors
Corp. v. Washington,"3 which gave the states a freer hand in taxing
interstate commerce.
After more than three hundred cases on the subject of state
taxation of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has allowed
taxation by the states in two situations-taxation of production
activities (manufacturing and mineral extraction) by the state of
origin and taxation of inshipments by the state of destination.,
From such a plethora of decisions, one would think that the Court
would have established a series of cogent, cohesive guidelines for
dealing with the varied tax situations. Such has not been the case,
however. A multiplicity of doctrines has resulted, none explicitly
overruling the others and each with its own significance. In the
past half century, the Court has applied an assortment of
distinguishable tests embracing either (and sometimes both) the
due process or the commerce clause. Such tests include the con-
cepts of "local incidents," "direct-indirect taxation," "discrimina-
tion," "multiple burdens," "doing business," "minimum connec-
"329 U.S. 249 (1946).
"West Virginia cases up until the 1960s continued in the main to emphasize
the "direct-indirect" analysis. See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 102 W. Va. 272,
135 S.E. 582 (1926), aff'd 274 U.S. 284 (1927); West Virginia Pipe Line Co. v. State,
95 W. Va. 285, 120 S.E. 759 (1923). Compare Arslain v. Alderson, 126 W. Va. 880,
30 S.E.2d 533 (1944) with Harper v. Alderson, 126 W. Va. 707, 30 S.E.2d 521 (1944).
See 68 W. VA. L. REv. 422, 424-25 (1966).
"WILLIS COhMsrrTEe REPORT, supra note 10, at 1047. State taxation of the prod-
ucts of manufacturing and mineral extraction, which may enter the stream of
interstate commerce, is constitutional, because such activities are separable local
incidents. Taxes on interstate sales of tangible personal property are generally
invalid as such sales are not considered separable local incidents. See Bluefield
Produce & Provision Co. v. Bluefield, 120 W. Va. 111, 196 S.E. 568 (1938). However,
a state may tax purely intrastate sales of tangible personal property by a mercantile
business.
9377 U.S. 436 (1964).
",WILLIS COMMsIrTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1047.
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tions," and "apportionment." The use of these analyses has not
followed any historical transition; the Court seemingly abandoned
the rigid "direct-indirect" test in 1938, only to return to it in 1946.
Judicial confusion was evident in General Motors, where the
Court's determination rested on the "multiple burdens" test, and,
yet, part of the decision used the "local incidents" terminology
coined by the Court in 1919. Additionally, in many cases in which
factual situations were basically identical, the resolutions of the
issues by the Court differed because of contrasting philosophies.
Some judicial reasoning followed a strict formalistic approach,
basing the constitutionality of a state's tax on semantics. The
majority of the members of the Court have favored a more prag-
matic approach,5 but this approach is fraught with its own falla-
cies. Justice Frankfurter warned of the consequences of employing
broad tests such as "multiple burdens," stating in Wisconsin v. J.
C. Penney Co.: "We must be on guard against imprisoning the
taxing power of the states within formulas that are not compelled
by the Constitution but merely represent judicial generalizations
exceeding the concrete circumstances which they profest to sum-
marize."8 Such a verbal beacon has not been heeded by the Court.
Despite the multiplicity of doctrines and the conflicting
judicial philosophies, the crux of the Court's inadequate response
to state taxation of interstate commerce problems lies in its adop-
tion of vague standards, which ultimately give no true guidance as
to what can and cannot be taxed. The results of cases in the past
forty years have been generally regarded as a confusing mixture of
extreme permissiveness and uncompromising prohibitiveness, es-
pecially towards gross receipts taxes. The Willis Subcommittee
noted: "Students of the Court have found no coherent set of princi-
ples as to when a State might tax all of the receipts from an
interstate activity and when it might tax none."8 Possibly because
of a disinclination to write opinions which may essentially
legislate, the Supreme Court has never defined the breadth of the
"minimum connections" concept, nor has it ever explicated the
nuances of the "multiple burdens" doctrine. This deficiency is
x'Compare American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919), with Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). Compare J.D. Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938), with Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
Compare Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951), with General
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note
12, at 162-72, for a general commentary.
"311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
'7WILLIS CoMMrirEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1038.
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most evident in the General Motors decision, where, though the
court narrowed the grounds for taxation, it did not set up any new
factual guidelines. It merely left a promise of a judicial examina-
tion of each factual situation thereafter to determine if a sufficient
"nexus" exists.88 Thus, the Court has extended the jurisdiction of
the states' power to tax over a wider spectrum of commercial activ-
ities than ever before, but, in so doing, it has used only vague
generalizations, which have provided no definitive guidelines for
lower courts, state legislatures or businesses engaged in interstate
commerce.
I. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
The problems created by the conflict between the need for a
free-flowing economy and the revenue requirements of the states
have been treated inadequately by the judiciary. Congress has
previously intervened to define the limits of state net income tax
laws in reaction to the pervasive decision in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota.9 It seems clear that Congres-
sional action is again needed to remedy the inequities apparent in
unclear Court decisions and in the diversity and inconsistency in
present state taxation formulas.
The Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
of the Senate Finance Committee is presently conducting hearings
and considering proposals that would significantly affect state tax-
ation of interstate commerce. Senator Clifford P. Hansen (R.,
Wyo.), ranking minority member of the Subcommittee, recognized
the current problems of state taxation of interstate commerce in a
recent press release noting the urgency for reform: "Today. . . we
have a situation characterized by non-conformity, burdensome
and costly compliance procedures, and very substantial
uncertainty as to total tax liabilities." 0
It is important to recognize the difficulties that any new legis-
lation concerning state taxation of interstate commerce will have
to confront and overcome, especially with respect to gross receipts
taxes. Four interrelated problems face any legislative attempt to
1'112 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1207, 1213 (1965).
"358 U.S. 450 (1959). The decision was nullified by Public Law 86-272, 15
U.S.C. § 381 (1971), enacted by a disturbed Congress under the prodding of busi-
ness.
nPress Release, Senate Finance Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (August 3, 1973).
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regulate multistate taxation: (1) Lack of uniformity among state
laws, (2) absence of nexus guidelines, (3) potential for abuse, and
(4) unpopularity.
State tax laws are multitudinous and dissimilar, and even
with the same class of tax-such as gross receipts taxes-subject-
measure discrepancies are numerous. To provide uniformity
among state tax laws, federal legislation must either impose man-
datory guidelines as to the formulation of tax laws for each class
of tax or offer guidelines in the form of a uniform bill to be adopted
by the states at their election. Related to the problem of the diver-
sity of state tax laws is the lack of uniform apportionment of taxes
among states. There is little apportionment among the states of
taxes on interstate sales and, consequently, frequent overtaxation
occurs." The need for uniform apportionment has been the subject
of several model acts9" in the past decade, and proposed legislation
contains an apportionment formula of limited application. 3
The absence of nexus guidelines for all taxes except net in-
come taxes has led to a great expansion in the area of permissible
taxation and often to diverse and inequitable court-litigated re-
sults. Northwestern States Portland Cement,94 which broadened
the states' taxing power, was counteracted by Public Law 86-272,
which restricted the imposition of the net income tax to certain
nexus requirements. Public Law 86-272 has subsequently been
very narrowly applied by the courts to situations that exactly con-
"WILLIS CoMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1047.
'2The Interstate Taxation Act and the Multistate Tax Compact are two of the
more recent unsuccessful model acts. The Interstate Taxation Act, which was
passed by the House of Representatives in May 1968, provided in substance that a
state would be barred from applying a tax apportionment formula when the tax
liability computed thereunder would exceed liability as computed under the bill's
formula. H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 201,202 (1968). A counterproposal was
the Multistate Tax Compact, 29 STATE TAX REV. (No. 24) 2 (1968), drafted by the
Council of State Governments in 1966 and providing for a three-factor apportion-
ment formula. West Virginia is an associate member of the Compact. For an analy-
sis of these efforts, see Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Road-
way Express, the Diminishing Privilege Tax Immunity and the Movement Toward
Uniformity in Apportionment, 36 U. CHI. L. Rav. 186, at 211-19 (1968). For a
discussion of apportionment and related solutions dealing with sales and use taxes,
see Kust & Sale, supra note 31, at 1308-24.
'S. 1245 contains an optional three-factor apportionment formula (property,
payroll and sales) for net income taxes only. S. 1245, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201
(1973). S. 2092 contains a similar apportionment formula. S. 2092, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 301 (1973).
"1358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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form to the requirements of the statute.95 General Motors further
emphasizes the need for legislation similar to Public Law 86-272
to define more extensively the limits of interstate taxation in view
of the due process requirements."5
Federal legislation should also address itself to the fact that
present state tax laws are frequently abused by both state tax
officials and corporations, and any new statutes will create a simi-
lar potential for abuse. A Congressional study of taxation of inter-
state commerce in the mid-1960s discovered that precise and pre-
dictable statutory rules were lacking and "the uncertainties of con-
stitutional law and state statutes and regulation [had] been per-
petrated on the level of administrative practice."9 Thus, careful
language and construction of any resulting legislation and subse-
quent regulations are essential.
An additional problem faced by statutory schemes that at-
tempt to regulate gross receipts taxes is their lack of popularity
among states. Only eight states have general gross receipts taxes,9"
and, as a result, most sponsored legislation in Congress dealing
with taxation of interstate commerce involves the more popular
revenue measures, such as net income taxes, capital stock taxes,
and sales and use taxes.9
Solutions to the above-mentioned issues are compounded by
the differences of opinion that exist among representatives of busi-
nesses of various types and sizes and between the various states
themselves, as well as splits of opinion between business and the
states. There are no clearly aligned interests. Rather, the situation
is dominated by shifting alliances of combined state and business
interests.' 8 Thus, legislative draftsmen must be able to balance
these competing interests without weakening the effects of any
proposed bills. In order for the variance and inconsistency of Court
decisions and state tax statutes to be remedied, Congress must be
"See Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275 (1972);
Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 57 N.J. 199, 270 A.2d 702 (1970); Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley,
109 N.J. Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213 (1970).
rWILLIS COMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1046.
17Id. at 1061.
"'Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Missisippi, Washington, and
West Virginia have taxes of general applicability on the gross receipts of a business.
Id. at 1009.
'S. 1245 deals with net income taxes or capital stock taxes. S. 2092 concerns
only net income taxes and sales and use taxes.
'1'34 STATE TAX REV. (No. 33) 2 (1973).
20
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cognizant of these various interrelated factors in order to formulate
workable solutions, via legislation, to the problems involved in
state taxation of interstate commerce.
Charles F. Printz, Jr.
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